We provide a new, quantum inspired, proof for the celebrated claim of [LFKN92] that P #P ⊆ IP. The protocol is fundamentally different from the original sum-check protocol of [LFKN92, Sha92] , as well as from variants of this proof [GKR08, Mei09], though it still possesses the overall structure of inductively checking consistency between subsequent step. The protocol is inspired by [AAV13]. Hopefully, this protocol will be helpful in making progress towards two major open problems: resolving the quantum PCP question, and verification of quantum computations using a classical BPP verifier. Given the historical importance of the sum-check protocol in classical computational complexity, we hope that the new protocol will also find applications in classical complexity theory.
Introduction
The sum-check protocol, introduced in the celebrated P #P ⊆ IP and the IP = PSPACE results [LFKN92, Sha92] , played a key role in computational complexity, most notably leading to the proof that MIP = NEXP [BFL91] and then to the (original, algebraic) proof of the celebrated PCP Theorem [ALM + 98, AS98]. Another important example application comes from cryptography: secure delegation of computations (initiated in [GKR08] ), in which the honest server is a BPP machine, but the user (verifier) is much weaker computationally.
Deriving quantum versions of both of these major results remains open. The quantum PCP conjecture [AALV09, AAV13] remains unresolved despite many recent advancements (in both directions), see e.g. [BH13, FH13, EH15, FV15, Ji16a, Ji16b, NV16] . It is considered a major problem in the field of Hamiltoniam Complexity. Interestingly, yet another holy grail in quantum complexity has to do with the delegation of quantum computation. Here the goal is slightly different than its classical counterpart. The question is whether a BPP verifier can delegate polynomial time quantum computations (namely computations in BQP) to an honest BQP prover (like in the classical case, security is required against dishonest provers with unbounded computational power). The initial protocols for the problem [ABOE10, FK12] allowed the BPP verifier to process constantly many quantum bits; However despite much follow-up work on related questions (see, e.g., [RUV13, MF16, ABOEM17] it is still open whether verification can be done with a single prover, when the verifier is entirely classical, namely a BPP machine.
The fact that these two central questions remain open despite increasing interest and research, and although the respective classical results are well known, is no coincidence. There seem to be some inherent obstacles towards quantum generalizations of classical interactive proof techniques (see, e,g, [AALV09, AAV13] ). In particular, these tools rely heavily on local tests, whereas the correlations in quantum states are highly non-local and cannot be addressed locally. We are thus motivated to develop alternative tools for interactive protocols, which are more natural to the quantum setting. In this work we revisit the fundamental sum-check protocol of [LFKN92, Sha92] , and provide an alternative protocol for the task; we believe the new protocol is better adapted to the quantum world, and in particular possesses an inherent tensor product structure. We stress that the resulting theorem itself, namely a rederivation of [LFKN92] , is entirely classical, and in particular neither the verifier nor the prover in the protocol need be quantum.
Our Results
For two complexity classes V, P, denote the complexity class IP[V, P] to be (informally) the set of all languages for which there exists an interactive proof protocol between a verifier which has computational power V and a prover, such that the protocol is complete even if the prover is computationally limited to P, but where the soundness holds regardless of any computational assumption on the prover.
Our basic protocol works in the quantum setting; it works for problems in BQP (in fact, in PostBQP. Recall that roughly, this class is the class of problems which can be solved by quantum computers which are allowed to project some of the qubits on desired results; see Section 2.5 for exact definition). The verifier is a BPP machine, and the honest prover is required to be PostBQP. We derive an interactive protocol which proves: Theorem 1.1. PostBQP ∈ IP [BPP, PostBQP] . Furthermore, the IP[BPP, PostBQP] protocol has completeness 1.
However, as Aaronson showed, PostBQP = PP [Aar05] , hence the prover is a PP machine. It is not difficult to apply the fact that P #P = P PP to arrive at the well known result of [LFKN92] The derivation of Theorem 1.2 from Theorem 1.1 first uses P PP = P #P [FG02] , and works for a language in P PP . It then relies on the verifier simulating the P machine for any language in P PP and invoking the interactive protocol of Theorem 1.1 whenever P would have called the PP oracle. The detailed proof can be found in appendix C.
Thus, we arrive at a new proof of the celebrated theorem of [LFKN92] , and a new sum-check protocol. The protocol is very natural to use when considering quantum related problems, since it applies directly to evaluating products of local projections and local unitary matrices which appear naturally in quantum complexity. Considering the classical setting, our protocol can be used for a P #P problem, as in [LFKN92] , in the following way: given a P #P problem, one would need to map the problem first into a P PP problem, using P #P = P PP [FG02] , then map each of the PP problems into a PostBQP circuit, (this can be done using an easy combinatorial reduction, by [Aar05] ) and then invoke the interactive protocol for each of the PostBQP problems.
An overview of the protocol
Our protocol differs from that of [LFKN92, Sha92] in a few crucial points, but still exhibits the same overall structure of the original sum-check protocol [LFKN92, Sha92] , of inductive consistency checking along a path from the root of a tree to a leaf. Let us review this overall structure since it is useful to have in mind when explaining the new protocol. At the root of the tree we have a complicated calculation, and the children of the root correspond to slightly simpler calculations; as we go down the tree, the calculations become simpler and simpler so that at a leaf, we reach a calculation that the verifier can compute on his own. The prover first commits (namely sends to the verifier) the values of the calculations at the root, and at all its children. The verifier first performs some consistency test between the values of children and that of the root, and then picks randomly one of these children, and challenges the prover to prove that value (which is again a root of a tree, except one level shorter). They now continue starting from the new node as a root. As the protocol progresses, the verifier goes down along one path of this tree towards a leaf, whose value he can verify on his own. The main idea is that if the claimed value at a certain node q was wrong then in order for the consistency check between that node and the values of its children to pass with high probability, many of the children's values must also be wrong. So with high probability, if the prover committed to a wrong claim, he is still committed to a wrong claim also in the next round -so he is "caught in his lies" until the verifier and prover reach a simple claim which the verifier can calculate by himself, at which point he will catch the lie.
In the sum check protocol, the claimed value was the value of the exponential sum of the evaluations of a polynomial in n variables b 1 , . . . , b n : b1∈{0,1} · · · bn∈{0,1} P (b 1 , . . . , b n ) = K.
1 While the original result might be more closely regarded as P #P ∈ IP[BPP, #P], using P #P = P PP we get an equivalence, as can be seen in Section 3
Here, our claimed value at the root would be the trace of what we call a top row matrix (see definition 2.1). This is an exponential size matrix
, where each of the G i is a quantum gate acting non-trivially on at most 3 out of n qubits. That value too can be viewed as an exponential sum.
Protocol overview: Imagine we are a BPP verifier, and we would like to verify that the value of tr (A) = tr (|0 n 0 n | · G T · · · G 1 ) = C, by interacting with a PostBQP prover. To do this, the prover and verifier will keep updating the matrix A = A 0 ; at the ith round, the verifier will pick a random unitary U i acting non-trivially only on the three qubits that the gate G i works on, and the prover will be challenged to prove the trace of the updated matrix A i , defined to be
The interaction goes as follows: each round, the verifier asks the prover to provide him with the reduced density matrix of A i on the set of qubits which the next gate, G i+1 , works non-trivially on (The first round is the 0'th round, at which the prover is asked to provide A 0 reduced to the qubits of G 1 ). His consistency check at round i > 0 is to compare between the trace of this reduced matrix, denoted M i , and the trace of a three qubit matrix derived by some simple manipulation involving a rotation by U i , on the matrix M i−1 he recieved from the prover in the previous round.
Notice that it is critical for our protocol, that the randomness is provided by matrices U i which are not general 3-qubits unitaries, but which have a very particular structure: they are tensor products of random single qubit matrices. Since the multiplication of such matrices (U T · · · U 1 ) is still in the form of tensor product of single qubit matrices, this is what allows the verifier at the end to compute the trace of
We must prove that this structure provides sufficient randomness to catch a cheating prover; namely, that the prover could not give us a false original reduced matrix with a false trace, and then in the next round, switch to a reduced matrix which is true, but will pass the consistency test.
The soundness relies on the following central basic fact. Consider round i. Suppose the difference between the correct reduced matrix M i and the one the prover actually sent (which we denote by
The fact that the randomness in tensor product unitaries is sufficient to detect that this difference is non-zero, is captured by the following Lemma 1, central to this work (and proven in appendix A): Lemma 1. Let ∆ be an operator on n qubits and let u = u 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ u n be a unitary operator on n qubits:
Where U (2) in the above is a probability distribution over single qubit matrices, which is closely related to the Haar measure but not equal to it (see Definition 4.1). The reason not to work with Haar measure is that later, when handling precision issues -see below -the distribution U (2) seems simpler to work with. This lemma allows us to prove that if the prover cheated in an earlier round, he must continue to cheat in the next round, or the consistecy check will detect an "inconsistency".
Handling Precision errors Of course, all the above discussion neglected the fact that the verifier and prover cannot work with infinite precision, namely, with real numbers and coninuous probability measures. We modify the protocol by approximating all the above to include exponentially small errors (where also the consistency test is performed up to exponentially small errors); thus, the communication between the verifier and prover is ploynomially bounded. The proof that the entire analysis goes through is much more tedious than the proof for the basic protocol which assumes infinite precision calculations; however it uses only simple algebraic manipulations. The main idea in the proof is given by Claim 6.2. In this claim, a very important observation is made. It turns out that the prover in the protocol can always reduce the trace of the error matrix ∆ by some constant factor each round. Our main lemma for the approximation case, Claim 6.2 states that if the prover is not caught in the protocol, it must mean that the error is not decreasing faster than some exponent in the number of rounds. Since the precision of the calculations of the verifier at the final stage is exponentially good, the error cannot decrease below that precision, and thus the cheating will be detected.
It should be mentioned that this effect in which the prover can reduce its error exponentially in the number of rounds, is very important for the possible application to verification with a BQP prover. See Subsection 1.4 for further discussion on this point.
1.3
Comparison to the Sum-Check protocol [LFKN92, Sha92] , and other Related work A crucial difference between the known classical protocol [LFKN92, Sha92] and ours is this. In the classical sum-check protocol, the final verification at a leaf is always of a single value out of exponentially many in the sum. In our protocol, on the other hand, the computation that the verifier needs to perform at the leaf is of the form
for single qubit matrices w i . Notice that naively, this value is the sum of exponentially many terms. It is only because of the tensor product structure of this expression, that this exponential sum can actually be calculated efficiently by the verifier. The fact that the verification at the leaf is of an exponential sum, and, relatedly, the tensor product structure of the protocol, which is naturally quantum, is an inherent difference between this protocol and the classical ones. Our protocol has similarities in structure with the interactive proof protocol for QMA in [AAV13] . The idea in [AAV13] is to consider the local Hamiltonian H, which is the input to the QMA problem, and the result of the QMA computation is encoded in the trace of a highly non-local matrix f (H) which involves polynomial powers of H. The randomness in the protocol is provided not by random unitaries but by random projections, each time on a single qubit. We note that though implicit in [AAV13] , we believe that the essence of the security of the [AAV13] protocol could also be highlighted by a similar lemma to Lemma 1, except for random projections rather than random unitaries; in both protocols randomization is done by single qubit manipulations. The explanation of the protocol of [AAV13] using a similar lemma to Lemma 1 remains to be done.
Our work improves on [AAV13] in several aspects. Most importantly, our result applies not only to QMA but to any problem in P #P , thus rederiving the celebrated classical result of [LFKN92] , and connecting our (quantum-inspired though classical) protocol to the world of classical complexity classes. We do not know how to directly extend the protocol of [AAV13] to apply for P #P , due to it strongly relying on the structure of local Hamiltonians. Another difference is that the protocol presented here itself is considerably simpler than that of [AAV13] , when applied to a problem in BQP; Moreover, when applied to a quantum circuit, our protocol preserves its structure. In that context, the [AAV13] protocol goes through a series of reductions, in which a BQP instance would be first reduced to a local Hamiltonian instance, which will in turn be reduced to a calculation of the trace of a matrix which is not a local Hamiltonian. The result is that [AAV13] involves a more complicated abstract structure, in which essentially the tree is replaced (roughly) by a tree of trees, namely, after a sequence of rounds, the parties reach a situation in which the problem becomes slightly simpler, and then they need to start again, for the slightly simpler problem, and they repeat this for polynomially many times.
discussion
We hope that our protocol may be helpful as a starting point towards showing BQP ∈ IP[BPP, BQP], namely replacing the prover in our protocol by a BQP prover. This remains as a major open problem and was in fact a major motivation for this paper. We explain below however why resolving the problem would require considerably new ideas.
First, note that a BQP prover could crudely approximate a PostBQP prover by an additive approximation. This could naively suggest that when applying the protocol to a problem in BQP, the exponential precision in our protocol is not needed; it is sufficient to request that the prover only provides approximate answers, and the verifier accepts if the consistency checks are approximately satisfied. Hence, perhaps, if only additive approximation is required, the prover in our protocol can be replaced by a BQP prover? If possible, that would resolve the above major problem of verifying BQP computations using a classical BPP verifier.
Unfortunately, there is a serious problem with this suggestion. The problem has to do with exactly the exponential decay in the error mentioned earlier. Let us explain the issue very roughly below (compromising rigor to make the argument clearer). Recall that in our protocol, consistency checking is done by comparing only the traces of two matrices (at each round). Let us assume that the prover wants to prove a wrong claim, namely that the trace of the exponential matrix A is in fact C where C is different from the correct value tr(A) by δ 0 ; In other words, the prover sends in the first round M ′ 0 such that tr(M ′ 0 ) = C; recalling that the correct matrix is denoted M 0 , we have tr(M ′ 0 ) = tr(M 0 ) + δ 0 . We refer to δ 0 as the initial error. The idea is that the prover can always decrease the error by a constant factor each round, and still pass the consistency tests. The way the prover will do this, is by "spreading his error" at each round as much as possible, as follows: at each round he will send M ′ i = M i + ∆ i such that ∆ i = δ i I/8, where δ i is his current error. In other words, he spreads his error evenly on all diagonal elements in his matrix. The claim is that because of the randomization process, on average, his updated error δ i+1 = tr (∆ i · u i ) for the random unitary u i (chosen by the verifier in the following round) is smaller than δ i by a constant factor. Hence, as we had mentioned earlier in Subsection 1.2 -this strategy will make the initial error decrease by an exponential factor in the number of rounds (making our analysis of the protocol in which this exponential decay of error appears, namely Claim 6.3, essentially tight). Hence, the prover can get away with an exponentially large initial error; this is because the consistency tests of the verifier at the final round must allow some inaccuracies if the prover is only BQP. Making the protocol sufficiently robust to such errors, would lead to a solution to the problem but this seems to require significantly new ideas. We note that the same exponential decay of error is possible to achieve also in the original IP = PSPACE protocol; it is a very interesting problem to try and formalize this property of interactive protocols more rigorously.
Given the historical connection between interactive proofs and PCP, it is our hope that our protocol will be useful also for progress on the quantum PCP front. Another interesting open problem is to extend our protocol to all of PSPACE, and derive an alternative proof for the full IP = PSPACE result; we were not able to do this so far. It is also our hope that this protocol will prove useful in classical contexts, due to its genuinely different structure than previous protocols for the same important task.
Paper Organization
We begin with some notations and background in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3 we formally state our main results and show how they are derived given an interactive protocol W for proving the trace of a top row matrix. In Sec. 4,5 we present our idealized interactive protocol W (which assumes infinite precision) and prove its soundness and completeness. In Sec. 6 we provide the modified version of the protocol, W and analyze it to show that even when precision limitations are addressed, completeness and soundness hold.
Background

Notations
We use the following notations throughout the paper:
• Given a gate g i on a set s i of less than n qubits, we define G i = g i ⊗ I to be it's n qubits expansion (where I is over the qubits s i ).
• Similarly, given a general unitary u i or h i on less than n qubits, we define U i = u i ⊗ I and H i = h i ⊗ I to be their n qubits expansions.
• Given an operator ρ on hilbert space H = H A ⊗ H B , and given an orthonormal basis {|i } i for H A and {|l } l for H B , we can write ρ = i,k,j,l ρ i,j,k,l |i j| ⊗ |k l|. Tracing out H B , or equivalently reducing ρ to H A is defined as:
• Given a matrix B 2 n ×2 n , and a matrix z on a set s of qubits, we denote B's reduction to the qubits s (on which z operates) by B| z . Namely: B| z = tr s (B).
• U (2) -The measure on single qubit unitaries, from which we randomly toss our matrices. See Section 4.
• P -The complexity class P olynomial − T ime 2 .
• In definition 6.2 we use the notion ⌊f (θ, φ 1 , φ 2 )⌋ ξ . By this we mean any deterministic approximation of f (θ, φ 1 , φ 2 ), which can be computed by a P verifier using poly(n) bits, s.t |⌊f (θ,
Top Row Matrix
A top row matrix is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. Given a 2 n × 2 n matrix B, we define it's top row matrix to be: |0 n 0 n |B, where |0 n is the computational basis state on n qubits |00 · · · 0 . By referring to the top row matrix of a quantum circuit on n qubits which is given as a sequence of local gates g T . . . g 1 we mean the top row matrix of B = G T · G T −1 · · · G 1 .
IP[V, P]
The complexity class IP[V, P] is defined as such:
Definition 2.2. Given complexity classes V and P, IP[V, P] is the class of languages L ⊆ {0, 1}
* for which there exists a 2 party protocol W between a verifier of computational power V and a prover, such that for all inputs x, 
BQP and Q-CIRCUIT
Definition 2.3 (due to [BV97] ). The complexity class BQP is the set of languages which are accepted with probability 2/3 by some polynomial time Quantum Turing Machine.
Definition 2.4. The promise problem Q-Circuit is defined as follows. The input is a description of a sequence of gates g L , ...g 1 , taken out of a finite universal set of local quantum gates, acting non-trivially on at most 3 out of n qubits. L is polynomial in n. Yes instances and No instances are defined as follows:
n 2 1 3 Q-CIRCUIT is known to be complete for BQP. We can use for example the universal set of gates consisting only of Toffoli and Hadamard gates [Shi02] . Claim 1. Calculating the trace of the top row matrix for an arbitrary sequence of local gates g T . . . g 1 , acting non-trivially on 3 out of n input qubits such that T = poly(n), to within ± 1 6 is hard for BQP. We include this simple proof here since its idea will be used several times later on.
Proof. Given a Q-Circuit instance, Pr[0] can be written as follows:
Q-Circuit thus reduces to calculating (to within accuracy 1 6 ) the trace of the following top row matrix, defined for a sequence of gates consisting of T = 2L + 1 = poly(n) unitary local gates:
In Section 6 we present our interactive protocol W , which verifies any such trace to within inverse-exponential accuracy, thus showing an explicit IP for BQP. Furthermore, we show that the protocol can be carried out by a PostBQP prover.
PostBQP
Introduced by Aaronson in [Aar05] , the complexity class PostBQP consists of all of the computational problems solvable in polynomial time on a quantum Turing machine with postselection and bounded error. Formally, the class can be defined as such:
Definition 2.5. PostBQP is the class of languages L ⊆ {0, 1}
* for which there exists a uniform family of polynomial-size quantum circuits {C n } n≥1 such that for all inputs x, 1. After C n is applied to the state |0 · · · 0 ⊗ |x , the first qubit has probability ≥ 1 2 n of being measured |0 2. If x ∈ L, then conditioned on the first qubit being |0 , the second qubit is |0 with probability at least 2/3. 3. If x / ∈ L, then conditioned on the first qubit being |0 , the second qubit is |0 with probability at most 1/3.
We remark that this definition is slightly different than the the original definition of [Aar05] , where the probability in item 1 was only required to be non-negative. As noted by Aaronson later in [Aar14] this corrected definition is in fact the one to be used, as only for this definition do we know that PostBQP is equal to PP. Moreover, this equality holds when the quantum circuit is assumed to consist of only Hadamard and Toffoli gates.
We also remark the simple fact that PostBQP is closed under complement. This can easily be seen by flipping the second qubit prior to measuring.
A claim that will be important for us in order to show an interactive protocol for all languages L in PostBQP is the following.
Claim 2. Any language L ∈ PostBQP can be decided by calculating a division y/z for two real values y and z which are both traces of top row matrices, each for an arbitrary sequence of local unitary quantum gates g T . . . g 1 , acting non-trivially on (at most) three out of n input qubits such that T = poly(n), and are each calculated to within accuracy ǫ = 1 10·2 n . Proof. Given a language L ∈ PostBQP with input x of n bits, consider the quantum circuit C n as in Definition 2.5, where the number of its ancilla qubits is n Anc and it acts on n ′ = n + n Anc qubits. Consider the final state of the circuit, C n (|00 · · · 0 ⊗ |x ). Denote by a the outcome of a measurement of the second qubit in that state in the computational basis, and by b the measurement outcome when measuring the first qubit in that state in the computational basis.
•
Consider the sequence of quantum gates g 1 , ...., g L describing the simple quantum computation consiting of first mapping |0 n → |x by flipping the required bits one by one, and then applying the circuit C n . It holds that:
And a similar argument to that used in proof of Claim 1 shows that both the nominator and denominator can be calculated by calculating the trace of a top row matrix which comprises poly(n) local gates. We denote the value in the nominator y, and the value in the denominator z, we keep in mind that z ≥ 10ǫ and go back to look at the two case:
• if x ∈ L: 
Derivation of Main Results
We now show how our main results, Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, can be derived from an interactive proof for the value of a top row matrix. In Section 6 we provide an interactive protocol W , with a BPP verifier, in which an honest PostBQP prover can prove the correctness of a value C claimed to be the trace of a top row matrix, to within inverse exponential accuracy. We will prove in that section (section 6) that W has completeness 1 even if the prover P is computationally limited to PostBQP. We prove that W has soundness at most 1 3 against any prover in the same section.
We remark here that throughout the paper, in any place where the (PostBQP) prover P is said to compute entries or traces of matrices to within exponential precision, what we mean is that those values are recovered by the verifier V by a sequence of (polynomially many) binary search queries, as the prover's computational power is assumed to be the decision class PostBQP. Proof. By Claim 2 it suffices to verify the traces of two top row matrices to within ± 1 10·2 n in order to decide on any instance of a language L ∈ PostBQP. By Claims 5 and 6 the protocol W does just that for a single top row matrix, with completeness 1 (even when the prover is restricted to be a PostBQP machine) and soundness at most 1 3 . By repeating the protocol W twice and accepting if and only if both runs of W pass (for each of the two top row matrices), the soundness of each of the top row matrices is reduced to 1 9 , while maintaining completeness 1. By the union bound, this means that conditioned on both (repeated) protocols passing, the probability for one the values of the traces of not be within ± 1 10·2 n of its actual value is at most Proof Sketch: We first note that the protocol of Theorem 1.1 can be repeated so that the error (soundness) is exponentially reduced. Now, for any language in P #P = P PP = P PostBQP we construct a protocol where each query to the PostBQP oracle is simulated by using the repeated protocol of Theorem 1.1. The repeated Theorem 1.1 protocol is used both for the original query and for its complement. The original query is used for verifying that the answer is 1 (if that is the case), and if it is not the case -the complement query is used to verify that the answer is 0. The combination gives the correct (oracular) answer with probability exponentially close to 1 (in the number of repetitions), so by using the union bound -we get that with high probability all the oracle call simulations give the correct results. This in turn means that the verifier, which simulates the P PostBQP algorithm, will deduce the correct answer. The complete proof of Theorem 1.2 can be found in Appendix C.
The Interactive protocol (assuming unlimited precision)
We will now present our first protocol, which verifies the trace of a top row matrix A for a quantum computation given by a sequence of local quantum gates g 1 , · · · , g T .
That is, our protocol verifies tr (A) = C for A = |0 n 0 n |G T · G T −1 · · · G 1 and value C. This first protocol, denoted W , assumes infinite precision, and works with completeness 1 and soundness 0.
The protocol begins by the verifier asking the prover to send the three qubit matrix M 0 , which is the matrix A = A 0 reduced to the qubits of the first gate g 1 . Of course, the prover may not send the correct matrix; Denote by M ′ 0 the actual matrix the prover sends. The verifier then performs his first consistency check: he checks that the trace M ′ 0 is indeed C, as expected. Next, the verifier chooses a random unitary U 1 acting on the three qubits of the gate, G 1 , which will be used soon to "replace" the gate G 1 in the matrix. Importantly, U 1 is chosen to be a tensor product of random single qubit matrices. U 1 will be used to define a new target computation A 1 , A 1 is essentially defined to "peel off" G 1 from A = A 0 and replace it by the random U 1 , in a cyclic manner:
. Now, the prover is supposed to send M 1 , which is A 1 reduced to the three qubits of the next gate, G 2 ; The reduced matrices that the verifier has, M ′ 0 and M ′ 1 , don't even act on the same set of qubits, but if correct, their traces can be related, which is the consistency check that the verifier performs.
If they pass, the verifier and prover pass to "peeling off" the next gate: the verifier now picks a randomization matrix U 2 for the qubits of G 2 , asks for another matrix M 2 , and so on.
At the end of this process, because all U i are tensor product matrices, the verifier is left with a calculation composed strictly of tensor product operators, which he can compute by himself.
The soundness of the protocol relies on the fact that if M ′ i is different than M i the prover must be extremely lucky (in the choice of U i ) to be able to send M ′ i+1 = M i+1 and still pass the consistency check. Thus he is caught in his lies, and must continue cheating also in the next round (and send M ′ i+1 = M i+1 ). If he keeps doing this, he will get caught in the final round which is a computation the verifier can perform.
Before moving to a the full description of the protocol, we will define U (2) -the measure on single qubits unitaries from which unitaries in the protocol are drawn.
We note that this measure is reminiscent of the Haar measure on single qubit unitaries, Except that according to the Haar measure the distribution of the angle θ is different [Ozo09] . We use this modified measure as it simplifies the calculations.
We now give a detailed description of the protocol W , where the verifier V is given a quantum top row matrix
, and interacts with a prover P (which we assume here in this first protocol to be unbounded) to verify tr (A) = C:
The protocol W: 
V receives back a matrix M The main idea in our protocol is the fact that the u i unitaries are simple enough to allow V to accurately compute tr (U T · U T −1 · · · U 1 · |0 n 0 n |) -this is true as |0 n 0 n | = |0 0| ⊗ |0 0| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |0 0|, and so the matrix
n 0 n | is in fact a product of matrices, where each of these matrices is a tensor product of single qubit matrices. But still, the u i unitaries provide enough randomness for our consistency checking to be effective. That is, if P did not provide us the M i−1 matrix we asked for at round i − 1, he will not pass the consistency checking tr (M i ) = tr (M i−1 · h i ) with the M i we asked for. The proof of completeness is given in subsection 5.1, and that of soundness in subsection 5.2.
Completeness
To prove the protocol's completeness, we will first prove the following basic Lemma 2 (proven in appendix D): Lemma 2. Let U an operator on a hilbert space H, and q an operator on a subsystem Q of H:
Definition 5.1. We define P 's Truthful Strategy to be:
1. In the 0'th round -P sends back A| g1 .
2.
In the i'th round -P receives u i from V , and sends back (
Claim 3. if tr (A) = C, P passes W with probability 1
Proof. We show that using it's Truthful Strategy, P passes each of V 's verification stages:
Claim 3.1. V 's verification passes the 0'th round.
Proof. This is obvious, as C = tr (A) = tr (A| g1 )
Claim 3.2. V 's verification passes the i ∈ [T − 1]'th round.
Proof. This is true, as using Lemma 2:
Claim 3.3. V 's verification passes the T 'th round.
Proof.
And so the proof for Claim 3 is established.
Soundness
Claim 4. if tr (A) = C, P passes W with probability 0.
Proof. First, let us define for each round i the three qubits matrix ∆ i which is the error matrix for that round. ∆ i is the difference between the correct matrix M i and the matrix M ′ i that the prover actually sent:
. Using this notation, and assuming P passes the 0 ′ th round, the assumption tr (A) = C translates into:
So ∆ 0 = 0. In order for P to pass the tests in W , P must pass all of the rounds {1, · · · , T − 1}, and either:
1. pass round i (for some 0 < i < T ) with ∆ i−1 = 0 and ∆ i = 0; or:
2. pass the T ′ th round with ∆ T −1 = 0 Consider the first case: for some 0 < i < T we have ∆ i−1 = 0 while ∆ i = 0. We claim that the probability (over the choice of u i ) for P to pass the consistency test tr(M
is 0. This is because by the linearity of the trace, and using the fact that tr(M i−1 · g −1 i · u i ) = tr(M i ) (as we have seen in the completeness analysis) this entails:
As g
is unitary, we have
= 0, so we can use Lemma 1 with the non-zero matrix ∆ ′ , to show that the probability for this over the choice of u i is 0. Hence, we can deduce that if P passed the tests at all rounds up to round T , it must be that ∆ T −1 is nonzero. We now remember that tr M T −1 · g −1
n 0 n |), and the prover needs to pass the test tr M
T is a non zero matrix, we have again that the probability for u T to satisfy this is zero, using Lemma 1. This means that if P passes the first T − 1 rounds, he has zero probability to pass the final round. This concludes the proof of Claim 4.
Having shown both the completeness and soundness parameters for W , we thus conclude the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Handling precision errors
The previous discussion of the protocol W made the implicit assumption that all values can be computed and communicated over a classical channel with infinite accuracy. But of course, this assumption is false. The prover and verifier cannot communicate real numbers with infinite precision, the verifier cannot truly sample a unitary from the modified Haar measure with infinite precision. Indeed, the protocol W was introduced for didactic purposes; We now show how it can be slightly adjusted such that it uses only polynomially many bits of classical communication, and can be carried out efficiently. We denote the adjusted protocol W .
The modifications in the protocol are of several types, and we will use several accuracy parameters to describe them. First, since everything is going to work up to some accuracy, the consistency checking can no longer be done using equality tests. Instead, each test for equality in W 's verification, is checked up to a small accuracy parameter µ = K 4χ T where K = 1 10·2 n and χ = 60 12 T 9 (where T is the number of gates). Another change is that the u j i unitaries cannot be chosen from the measure U (2), as this requires infinite precision. Instead, we introduce another accuracy parameter ξ = µ 2 2n+11 T = Θ( 1 2 n c ), and the parameters defining the unitary matrix entries are defined up to this ξ: Definition 6.1. We define choosing a unitary operator on a single qubit according to the truncated measure as choosing angles θ, ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 with precision ξ uniformly at random from [0, 2π] (By this, we mean that θ, ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 are chosen uniformly at random from {i · ξ i ∈ N, i · ξ < 2π}). These angles are the representation for the unitary
We denote generating an operator u on a single qubit according to this altered measure by: u ∽ U (2) One final issue we have to address, is the fact that given a unitary u on a single qubit, we can not assume V nor P can perform u accurately. We introduce the following approximation notion: Definition 6.2. Given a unitary operator
on a single qubit, we define the truncated unitary u to be a version of u where each each of the entries is calculated up to an accuracy of ξ:
we present the full protocol W , in which a BPP verifier V is given a sequence of local quantum gates g T , . . . , g 1 , receives a value C from the prover P , and for the top row matrix A 2 n ×2 n = |0 n 0 n | · G T · G T −1 · · · G 1 verifies whether tr(A) = C or |tr(A) − C| ≥ 1 10·2 n = K by interacting with P . By Claim 2, such a protocol is sufficient to derive an IP for P #P .
The protocol W : n . This should never be the case as each entry is the sum of less that 2 n values which are at most 1 each) 3. In the T'th round -V chooses u T as before, and accepts if:
(rejects otherwise).
Completeness
Claim 5 (Completeness for the bounded case). if |tr(A) − C| ≤ ξ = µ 2 2n+11 T , a PostBQP prover P can pass W with probability 1, using P oly(n) bits of communication.
We give here the skeleton of the proof, the proofs of the technical lemmas can be found in Appendix E.
Proof. We first note that for completeness in the bounded precision case, we must require P to have the power of a PostBQP machine. This means that when P is asked to perform any given unitary u on a single qubit (or tensor product of such, of course), it computes an approximationũ using its universal set of Hadamard and Toffoli gates s.t: ũ − u L2 ≤ ξ, and operates withũ instead of u. P can do this in P oly(n) time as long as 
We use the convenient notation
, and note that a PostBQP machine P can be used to compute A t (where t is the number of Hadamard gates), and as such can be computed by 2 #P calls. We now remember PP = PostBQP [Aar05] , and that for any function f ∈ #P the language L = {(x, k)|f (x) ≥ k} is in PP [FG02] 3 . We can now define P 's Truthful Strategy under W . Having defined P 's Truthful Strategy under W , we show that if T r(A) = C, P passes W with probability 1 by using its Truthful Strategy. To do this we set n ′ = 3 the number of qubits on which each of the gates g i operates, and use the following claims ∀ 0≤i≤T :
By taking f for each entry in A ′ i |s to be the number of paths which contribute to that entry (once with a positive and once with a negative value), a PostBQP machine can indeed be used to compute
The Claims 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 are proven in Appendix E. Now we are ready to wrap up. By using ξ =
, and remembering that tr(
we get:
1. P passes the 0'th round, as |C − tr(M ′ 0 )| = 0 < µ. 2. P passes the i'th round for 1 ≤ i < T , as:
and of course, each entry of M ′ i is at most the sum of 2 n entries of A i , and each entry of A i is at most 1 in absolute value, so all entries of M ′ i are at most 2 n .
P passes the T'th round, as:
And the communication complexity follows trivially by the fact that there is a total of poly(n) rounds, in which a total of poly(n) values (degrees and matrix entries) are being communicated, and for each value it takes poly(n) classical bits to express it's accuracy ξ.
Soundness
Claim 6 (Soundness for the bounded case). if |tr(A) − C| ≥ K = 1 10·2 n , P passes W with probability ≤ 1 3 . Using the same notion for ∆ i as in 5.2, we will show that given |tr(A) − C| ≥ K = 1 10·2 n , and conditioned on P passing the first T − 1 rounds, there is only a small probability for tr (∆ T −1 ) to be small enough for P to be likely to also pass the final T 'th round.
To do this, we introduce an approximate version of Lemma 1, which we use in a similar fashion to the way we used Lemma 1 in proving the soundness for W .
Lemma 3. Let ∆ be an operator on n ′ qubits, and let
The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix D. This Lemma 3 will be used shortly with n ′ = 3 and m = 60T to bound the probability that tr (∆ · u) for a randomly chosen unitary u is too small. However, before doing this, we have to take care of another issue which arises due to precision matters. In W the unitaries are not chosen according to U (2), the distribution assumed in Lemma 3, but instead they are chosen from the distribution U (2). Therefore, we also state Claim 6.1 which enables to quantify the similarity of these two distributions and is proven in Appendix F. To present Claim 6.1, we define the two following probability distributions:
Definition 6.4. We define the distribution of unitaries on n ′ qubits, D(n ′ ), to be the one which is used in protocol W . Namely, choosing a unitary operator u ∽ D(n ′ ) means choosing n ′ unitaries on a single qubit
Definition 6.5. We define the distribution of unitaries on n ′ qubits, D(n ′ ), to be the one which is used in protocol W . Namely, choosing a unitary operator u ∽ D(n ′ ) means choosing n ′ unitaries on a single qubit
Claim 6.1. let ∆ an operator on n qubits:
We can now state the main lemma which will be used to prove Claim 6: this is Claim 6.2, which shows that there is only a small probability for ∆ T −1 to be small.
Claim 6.2. Let χ = 60
12 T 9 , and let 4χ
Then, conditioned on P passing the first i < T rounds in W :
The proof uses both Lemma 3 and the fact that the two distributions are similar, and can be found in Subsection 6.3. Now we can prove Claim 6.
Proof. Of Claim 6. To pass W , P must pass all rounds i < T , and then pass the T 'th round. By Claim 6.2, passing all rounds i < T implies:
So, denoting the probability that P passes W by P r Success , we have:
To evaluate the second term, we review the proof of Claim 3.3 to note:
Where we used a triangle inequality and Claims 5.4 and 5.3 for the inequality (noting the only assumption made on M i−1 for Claim 5.3 was its entries being smaller than 2 n so as to pass i'th round test) We can now bound P r Success by:
′ · 2 n , and so:
Where the second inequality is by Claim 6.1, and the last inequality is by using Inequality (7) (in the proof of Claim 6.2) for i = T − 1.
This gives us P r Success
6.3 Proof of Claim 6.2 Claim 6.2 Let χ = 60 12 T 9 , and let 4χ
Proof. By finite induction on 0 ≤ i ≤ T − 1:
• Induction base: For i = 0, the condition on passing the 0'th round gives us |C − tr (M ′ 0 )| ≤ µ and so we have:
So we have P r |tr(∆ 0 )| < K 4 = 0 as required.
• Induction step: Assuming correctness for 1 ≤ i < T − 2, we prove for i + 1. We use the total probability equation to bound the required probability by the probability of 3 separate events:
We upper bound each of the addends P 1 , P 2 , P 3 : -P 1 : By the condition on passing all the first i rounds, along with the induction assumption, we have
We note:
Using the fact that the Frobenius norm upper bounds the trace of a matrix for the first derivation, and the fact that operating on a matrix by a unitary on either of its sides does not affect it's Frobenius norm. We can now use Lemma 3 on∆ i = ∆ i · g −1 i+1 (with n ′ = 3, m = 60T ) to achieve:
And so:
By the fact that ∆ i has 2 2n ′ entries, all of which at most 2 n , we have
Using Claim 6.1, we have:
And we can now evaluate:
Where the first inequality follows from Inequalities (6) and (5), and the second inequality from Inequality (4).
Where we used a triangle inequality along with the condition on passing the (i + 1)'th round and Claim 5.3 to achieve the inequality. Summing the 3 addends, we get:
As required, thus concluding the proof for the induction step and hence of Claim 6.2 as well.
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A Lemma 1 proof Lemma 1. Let ∆ an operator on n qubits and let u = u 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ u n a unitary operator on n qubits:
Proof. By induction on n:
• 1.1 Induction base: For n = 1 we have:
and we can assume a = 0, as the following derivation is similar regardless of which entry of ∆ is non-zero. So we have:
we calculate an upper bound on the sum by proving an upper bound on each of the probabilities separately: 
we assume b and a have the same sign, and so:
Where the final equality comes from the fact that a = 0 and a has the same sign as b. If a and b do not have the same sign -we simply bound using ((a − b) sin ϕ 1 ) 2 .
4. P r a·e
=P r a·e
As H is some constant number independent of θ.
Summing the 4 probabilities, we get the induction base for Lemma 1.
• 1.2 Induction step: Assuming correctness for n, we prove for n + 1. Choosing a basis for the n + 1 qubits where the (n + 1)'th qubit is the most significant qubit, we have:
Where (U ) n = u 1 ⊗ u 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ u n , and we denote the number of qubits each block operates on in subscript, for clarity. Now we have:
W.L.O.G we can assume ∆ 1 = 0, so our induction base tells us tr(∆ 1 · U ) = 0, meaning ∆ ′ = 0. Using the induction base once again on ∆ ′ , u n+1 , we obtain the required induction step.
B Lemma 2 proof
Lemma 2. Let U an operator on a hilbert space H, and q an operator on a subsystem Q of H, then
By induction on i, the number of qubits Q works on non-trivially:
• Induction base: For i = 1 we have (choosing a basis for H where the single qubit in Q is the most significant qubit):
and so:
Assuming correctness for i, we prove for i + 1. Choosing a basis for H where the (i + 1)'th qubit in Q is the most significant qubit, and Q's other i qubits are the following significant bits -we have:
And we denote the number of qubits each operator operates on in subscript, for clarity. Now we have:
Where we used the induction step assumption for the 4'th equality.
And so, by induction we conclude the proof of Lemma 2.
C Proof of Theorem 1.2 given Theorem 1.1
Proof. Let L ∈ P #P = P PP = P PostBQP , then there exists an algorithm A(x) that runs in time polynomial in time |x| using m = poly( |x| ) queries to a PostBQP oracle, such that if x ∈ L A(x) = 1 and otherwise A(x) = 0. For i ∈ {1 . . . m} we denote the i'th query in A(x) q i , and its answer by the oracle r i . Each such quesry q i can be thought of as a request for the truth value of a term y ∈ L ′ for some y (of size polynomial in |x|) and a PostBQP complete language L ′ . We denote the query for the truth value of y ∈ L ′ by q i . Since PostBQP is closed under complement, L ′ ∈ PostBQP as well. By Theorem 1.1, this means that there is an interactive protocol W i between a BPP verifier V and a prover P with soundness at most 1 3 and completeness at least 2 3 for q i , and a similar protocol W i for q i , and the completeness holds even if P is restricted to be a PostBQP machine. We now consider the following interactive protocol between a BPP verifier V and a prover P : V simulates A, but whenever A calls for a query q i , V perform the following: 
Now, as we know that A(x) = 0, we can use the union bound to get:
Having shown an interactive proof protocol for L with soundness less than 1 3 and completeness 1, even when the prover P is restricted to be a PostBQP machine, this shows P #P ∈ IP[BPP, PP], and by PP = PostBQP we have Theorem 1.2.
D Lemma 3 proof
Lemma 3. Let ∆ be an operator on n ′ qubits, and let u = u 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ u n ′ :
Proof. By induction on n ′ :
• Induction base: For n ′ = 1 we have:
and we can assume |a| = max(|a|, |b|, |c|, |d|) ⇒ |a| ≥ K 2 , as the following derivation is similar regardless of which entry of ∆ is maximal in absolute value. So we have:
we calculate an upper bound on the sum by proving an upper bound on each of the probabilities separately:
We will prove for cos θ instead (and the probabilities are equal, as the functions only differ by a cyclic offset in the section):
Proof. Due to symmetry around π, we have:
We denote θ 1 = cos
and as the cosine function is monotonically increasing in [π, 2π] we have:
Remembering the lemma assumes m ≥ 2, we have:
since the derivative for cos θ in this section is at least Again, due to the period and symmetry of the cotangent function, it suffices to evaluate this probability over the section [0, • Induction step: Assuming correctness for n ′ , we prove for a matrix ∆ on n ′ + 1 qubits, assuming ∆ ≥ K. Choosing a basis for the n ′ + 1 qubits where the (n ′ + 1)'th qubit is the most significant qubit, we have:
Where (U ) n ′ = u 1 ⊗ u 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ u n ′ , and we denote the number of qubits each block operates on in subscript, for clarity. We now use the same notation as in the induction step in the proof of Lemma 1, and denote
Again we can assume W.L.O.G that ∆ 1 F rob ≥ K 2 , and so by our induction step assumption applied on the n ′ qubit matrix ∆ 1 , we have:
where the first inequality is due to the fact that |tr(∆ 1 · U )| ≤ ∆ ′ F rob . By the induction base, applied to the one qubit matrix ∆ ′ , we also have that if
We now recall that as in the proof of Lemma 1, Equation (9) we have
thus we can conclude by:
P r u 1 ,··· ,u n ′ +1 ∽U(2) |tr(∆ · u)| < 4K When the first inequality follows from the total probability equation along with Equation (12), the second inequality follows from Inequality (10) along with the simple observation that the probability to be smaller than a value -increases with that value, and the third inequality follows from Inequality (11).
E Claim 5 proof details
Herein We also note that for any κ ≥ 2π, and any event F :
P r x∽[0,κ) F ≤ P r x∽[0,κ) x ∈ [2π, κ) + P r x∽[0,κ)
x / ∈[2π,κ)
